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2.1  Introduction 
The literature on international trade under imperfect competition is now 
more than 10 years old. Many of the papers in this literature have been moti- 
vated by  policy concerns, yet much uncertainty remains about the possible 
effects of employing trade policy in a particular industry. This is partly because 
we now know that it is possible to construct models in which policy conclu- 
sions are sensitive to aspects of market conduct about which little is known. It 
is partly because little work has been done that attempts to quantify the effects 
of policy on particular industries. 
This paper takes a reasonably wide range of  industries and a number of 
alternative theories of trade and systematically investigates the effects of trade 
policy on each industry under each theory. The policy instruments studied are 
those most widely discussed in the literature-an  import tariff and an export 
subsidy. The equilibrium types covered include the cases of price and quantity 
competition, segmented and integrated markets, and oligopoly and monopolis- 
tic competition. 
The effects of policy under these different possibilities are established by 
undertaking a rather large number of numerical simulations. Using the results 
of  these simulations the paper addresses the following questions. First, are 
results sensitive to the equilibrium concept employed? Do we observe the mag- 
nitude, or even the sign, of the welfare effect of policy changing according to 
the theoretical model which has been chosen? Second, can we  identify the 
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characteristics of industries in which policy is successful in achieving welfare 
gains? Third, how large are the gains from policy? Do the qualitative effects 
established in the theoretical literature lead to quantitative effects of a signifi- 
cant magnitude? 
The first stage of this project involves specifying the theoretical models (sec. 
2.2) and calibrating these models to each of  the industries under study (sec. 
2.3). For given parameters, each theory predicts different levels of output and 
volumes of trade. The calibration procedure turns this around; data are avail- 
able on levels of  output and trade and on some parameters  of  the industry. 
Different theories then imply different values of unobserved parameters in or- 
der to support observations on the industry as an equilibrium. Of  course, if 
there were sufficient observations one might reject some theories in favor of 
others. Calibration does not  attempt this, but merely  solves for unobserved 
parameters. This procedure  is described in section 2.3, which discusses the 
way in which different theories lead to different interpretations of an industry 
data set. 
Having  calibrated each industry under each of the different theories, the 
second part of the project is to investigate the effects of trade policy. Import 
tariffs and export subsidies are evaluated in sections 2.4 and 2.5, and section 
2.6 presents some concluding comments. 
2.2  The Models 
We investigate four different equilibrium concepts, each applied within the 
framework of the same general model. This model has the same structure as 
that used in Smith and Venables (1988), and is briefly outlined here. 
The model is one of partial equilibrium, operating at the level of  a single 
industry. There are J  producing  and consuming  countries. The ith of these 
countries has n,  firms, and all firms in country i are assumed to be symmetric 
and to produce m, product types. These products are tradable, and x, denotes 
the quantity of a single product type produced by a firm in country i and sold 
in country j  at price p,. 
Demands in each country are derived from a Dixit and Stiglitz-type  welfare 
function (1977). Consumers  in country j  may consume products which  are 
produced in each country, so the number of  product types available for con- 
sumption is cJl=  ,n,m,. Subutility derived from consumption of these products 
is denoted y, and takes the form 
where the au are demand parameters describing the preferences of a consumer 
in country j for a product produced in country i.  The variable yj  can be regarded 
as a quantity index of aggregate consumption of the industry output. Dual to 43  Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Numerical Assessment 
the quantity index is a price index (or unit expenditure function), qj,  taking 
the form 
j  = 1,.  . . ,J. 
The p, are the prices of individual varieties, and q, can be interpreted as the 
price of the aggregate, y,.  Income effects are ignored, so that demand for the 
aggregate product is a function only of the price index, q,.  This demand func- 
tion is iso-elastic, taking the form 
(3) 
where the b, reflect the size of the respective country markets. Utility maximi- 
zation implies that demand for individual product varieties depends both on 
the price of the individual variety and on the aggregate price index, and de- 
mand functions take the form 
(4) 
y, = b,q,?,  j = 1, . . . ,J, 
xu = a&p,/q,>-"y, = q,b,p,;Eq;-v,  i,j = 1,.  . . ,J. 
The profits of a single representative country-i firm are 
J 
rTT,  = m&,,p,,(1  -  T,) -  c~(x,.~,),  i = 1, . . .  ,J, 
,=I 
(5) 
where the q, are the ad valorem costs of selling in marketj (transport costs or 
trade taxes, for example). The function C,  is the firm's cost function, assumed 
to depend on the output per variety, x, =  &x,,,  and on the number of varieties, 
m#.  The form of  this function is a weighted  average of  linear and loglinear 
functions in m, and x,, so it takes the form 
(6)  ~,(x,,m,)  = c,[z(c, + mzcm  + m,x,)  + (1 -  z)rn~xP], 
where z  describes the 1inearAoglinear share, c,,  cm,  a,  and p are parameters 
common to all countries, and c,  is a country-specific cost parameter. 
We investigate four different types of competitive interaction between firms. 
The first is the case of segmented-market Cournot behavior and is denoted case 
C in the following discussion. Under this hypothesis firms choose the quanti- 
ties they sell in each market, x,,,  given other firms' sales. The first-order condi- 
tion for profit maximization takes the form 
(7)  p,(l-q)  1--  = - -  ,  i,j = 1,. ..,.I,  4  .t,)  x3 
where e, is the perceived elasticity of demand and is given by 
(8) 
where so is the share of a single firm from country i in the countryj  market. 44  Anthony J. Venables 
The second form of competition we investigate is Bertrand price competi- 
tion, referred to as case B. Profit maximization given rivals’ prices gives first- 
order condition (7) with el,  taking the form 
(9) 
- 
ez, -  E -  (E -  q)s,,,  i,j = I, . . .  ,J. 
In the preceding two cases markets were segmented in the sense that firms 
played a separate game in each market, ignoring linkages between markets. 
We now turn to cases in which there is some degree of market integration, as 
some of firms’ decisions are taken with respect to all markets. This is modeled 
by  assuming that, instead of playing  a single-stage game, firms play  a two- 
stage game, choosing total output at the first stage and the distribution of out- 
put between markets at the second stage. Two different forms of the second- 
stage game will be investigated. In the first, referred to as case CB, we assume 
that, in the second stage, firms play a segmented-market price game. At the 
second stage of the game each firm therefore chooses its sales in each market, 
x~,, to maximize profits, taking as constant its total  sales x,  = c, xq  and the 
prices of other firms. This gives first-order conditions: 
where e,, = E -  (E-T))S~. At the first stage each firm chooses total output xz 
given the total output of other firms’ and fully incorporating the reallocations 
of sales between markets implied by the second-stage equilibrium, equation 
(lo), so establishing a perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game. (For 
theoretical analysis of this case see Venables [1990]). 
The case of full market integration  will be referred  to as case CI. If  the 
second-stage game has fully integrated markets then, for a given total xI,  at the 
second stage sales x,,  are determined by arbitrage, so as to equate the producer 
price of a particular product in each market. Second-stage equilibrium there- 
fore has xl  = C,  xj,  and prices satisfying 
At the first stage, each  firm chooses  total  output x,  given other firms’ total 
output and fully incorporating the reallocations of sales between markets im- 
plied by the second-stage equilibrium, equation (  1  I). The perfect equilibrium 
of this game corresponds to the integrated market equilibrium analyzed by, for 
example, Markusen (1 98  1 ). 
We assume throughout this paper that the number of varieties produced per 
firm, m,, is a constant. The number is set so that output per model, x2,  is the 
same for all i.  In some of the simulations reported below the number of firms 
in each country will be held constant, and in others the number will be allowed 
to adjust in response to profit changes, so giving a monopolistically competi- 
tive equilibrium. 45  Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Numerical Assessment 
2.3  Calibration 
The theoretical models outlined above are applied to a world of six coun- 
tries-France,  the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
the rest of  the European Community and the rest of the world. Our treatment 
of  the rest of the world is somewhat crude, and in the two-stage games de- 
scribed above, the rest of  the world is treated  as being segmented  from the 
European economies. 
The industries to which the models are applied are listed in table 2.1 and 
use the same data as Smith and Venables (1988). Production and trade flows 
for each industry were derived from the Eurostat Annual Industrial Survey and 
from Eurostat NACE-CLIO trade tables for 1982. Numbers of firms in each 
industry were derived from Eurostat Structure and Activity of Production data 
on the size distribution of firms. These numbers were adjusted to capture the 
number of “subindustries” operating within the broadly defined industry, and 
then a Herfindahl index of concentration was computed for each country and 
for each industry. The cross-country  average values of these indexes are re- 
ported in table 2.1 and provide a summary measure of the degree of concentra- 
tion of each industry. This ranges from its highest  values in motor vehicles 
(350) and office machinery  (330) to lows  in machine  tools (322) and foot- 
wear (451). 
The second column of table 2.1 gives the price elasticity of demand for the 
aggregate output of  each industry, q.  Sources used to obtain these estimates 
were  Piggot  and  Whalley  (1985),  Deaton (1975),  Houthakker  (1965),  and 
Houthakker and Taylor (1  970). The third and fourth columns of table 2.1 give 
some characteristics of  the technology of the industry. These are drawn from 
Table 2.1  Industry Characteristics 
Herfindahl  Returns  Loglinear  U.K. Exports/ 
NACE Number: Name  Index  q  to Scale (96)  Share  production (%) 
257: Pharmaceutical 
products 
260: Artificial and 
synthetic fibers 
322: Machine tools 
330: Office machinery 




350: Motor vehicles 
438: Carpets, 
linoleum, etc. 
45 1: Footwear 
0.05  0.8 
0.05  0.5 
0.004  1.1 
0.12  0.9 
0.022  1.1 
0.11  1.7 
0.19  I .6 
0.031  0.9 
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the study of Pratten (1987). The returns to scale column gives the estimated 
increase in average costs associated with reducing per firm output from mini- 
mum efficient scale to half minimum efficient scale. This is largest in pharma- 
ceuticals (257), motor vehicles (350), and electric motors and generators (342) 
and least in footwear (451), carpets (438), and machine tools (322). The log- 
linear share column reflects the z parameter of equation (6)  and gives the pro- 
portion of marginal cost at minimum efficient scale (MES) coming from the 
two components of the cost curve. Choice of these numbers was judgmental 
and informed by Pratten’s work. If this weight is zero, then marginal costs are 
constant, but average cost is falling; this is appropriate if  returns to scale are 
due to fixed costs, for example, research and development. A positive loglinear 
share means that both average and marginal costs are declining and so, for 
example, captures industries where learning occurs. The final column in table 
2.1 gives the ratio of U.K. exports of each industry’s output to U.K. production, 
a ratio which is an important determinant of the welfare effect of some of the 
policy experiments undertaken. 
The  calibration procedure involves  solving unknown  parameters  of  the 
model so that the observed values of endogenous variables constitute an equi- 
librium of the model. There are a number of aspects to this, two of which are 
of economic interest: solving for the degree of product differentiation, E, and 
for the implicit barriers to trade. 
We assume that the base data set represents a long-run equilibrium in which 
profits are zero. Technology and firm scale imply a relationship between aver- 
age cost and marginal cost, and, with the assumption of long-run equilibrium, 
this  also  gives  a  relationship  between  price  and  marginal  cost.  This 
price-marginal cost margin is supported at equilibrium by  two considerations: 
product differentiation and market power stemming from the degree of con- 
centration in the industry and the form of  interaction between firms. If  the 
degree of product differentiation is known, then this relationship can be solved 
for the form of the competitive interaction between firms. This is the approach 
of Dixit (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1988), who use this relationship 
to solve for a conjectural variations parameter. However, for the industries un- 
der study here, products are certainly differentiated, but we have little informa- 
tion about the elasticity of  substitution between different products. The ap- 
proach we follow is therefore to assume a form of competition between firms 
and see what this implies for the degree of product differentiation consistent 
with observed price-cost margins. Of course, we do not know that the assumed 
form of  competition is correct. This is therefore an  essential dimension in 
which to conduct sensitivity analysis, so we undertake the calibration proce- 
dure for a variety of different forms of competition. Table 2.2 reports the re- 
sults of doing so for the four different types of equilibria described in section 
2.2 above. The E reported in the table are to be interpreted as the elasticities of 
demand for individual products, holding constant the prices of all other vari- 
eties. 47  Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Numerical Assessment 
Table 2.2  Calibrated Elasticities  (E) 




















CB  CI 
5.36  5.16 
12.72  12.29 
13.44  13.41 
15.52  14.48 
7.17  7.06 
9.60  8.79 
10.44  8.86 
18.68  18.49 











We learn a number of things from table 2.2. First, looking across equilibrium 
concepts we see a ranking of  E (which holds for all industries) in the order C, 
CB, CI, B. The relationship between cases C and B is as would be expected; 
as quantity competition (C) is inherently less competitive than price competi- 
tion (B), so less product differentiation (higher E)  is required to support a given 
price-cost margin as an equilibrium. The two two-stage games (CB and CI) are 
intermediate. Market power is lost as firms are no longer able to fully segment 
markets, but, at the aggregate level, both these cases assume quantity competi- 
tion, so are less competitive than the Bertrand equilibrium. The difference be- 
tween cases C and CI alerts us  to  the importance of the degree of country 
disaggregation. If markets are truly segmented, then we cannot aggregate them 
into country blocs; to do so would be to implicitly assume intrabloc integra- 
tion, and thereby overstate the level of competition. 
Looking across industries in table 2.2 we see a wide range in the extent of 
product differentiation. Firms derive relatively little market power from prod- 
uct differentiation in 45 1 (footwear), 438 (carpets), 330 (office machinery), 
and 322 (machine tools). The market power derived from product differentia- 
tion  is greatest in  257  (pharmaceuticals), 342 (electric motors,  etc.),  346 
(household appliances), and 350 (motor vehicles). The variation in E across the 
equilibria is largest for 260 (artificial fibers), 330 (office machinery), and 350 
(motor vehicles). These are all industries with a relatively high level of concen- 
tration as measured by the Herfindahl index; this influences E because the dif- 
ference between Cournot and Bertrand competition is an increasing function 
of firms’ market shares. 
Inspection of the data on trade and production indicates that firms have very 
much larger shares of their domestic markets than they do of foreign markets, 
which suggests the presence of barriers to trade. For given trade barriers, each 
of the theories described in section 2.2 implies different equilibrium volumes 
of intraindustry trade. The analog of this in calibration is that we  solve for a 
matrix of trade barriers consistent with observed trade flows between countries 
and with the observed market shares of firms in different countries. These cali- 48  Anthony J. Venables 
brated matrices of  trade barriers will be different for each theory. Table 2.3 
presents the average height of these trade barriers for intra-EC trade for each 
industry and each equilibrium type. The calibration reported in table 2.3 took 
place using the same elasticity E for each of the cases C, CB, CI, and C (with 
E set at its Cournot level, E~).  The numbers are expressed in “tariff-equivalent” 
form, as a proportion of price. We see that these implicit barriers are very high 
in some industries, notably 257 (pharmaceuticals) and 342 (electric motors, 
generators, etc.). The implicit barriers are greatest in case C, followed by CB, 
followed by  CI. This reflects the implications of  each of  these equilibrium 
concepts  for  trade  volumes  (for  analysis  of  these  volumes  see  Venables 
[ 19901).  Case CB gives the same trade barriers as case B because international 
price relativities are the same in these cases, (see eqq. [71, [91, and [lo]). 
The tariff-equivalent trade barriers reported in table 2.3 were derived using 
the same value of  E  for all equilibria, in order to illustrate the way in which 
different equilibria support different trade volumes. Computing the trade barri- 
ers simultaneously with the elasticities reported in table 2.2 gives the numbers 
contained in table 2.4. Trade barriers in cases CB, CI, and B are higher in this 
case than in table 2.3 because, although theories CB, CI, and B predict lower 
trade volumes than case C (given parameter values), the lower values of E asso- 
Table 2.3  Tariff Equivalent Trade Barriers (E = eC) 














































Table 2.4  Tariff Equivalent Trade Barriers 
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ciated with these equilibria mean that higher tariff equivalents are consistent 
with observed trade levels. 
Tariff-equivalent trade barriers are a way  of  displaying the size of implicit 
trade barriers consistent with equilibrium. Calibration incorporates each indus- 
try’s matrix of tariff-equivalent trade barriers into the model in the following 
way. Off-diagonal elements of T, are set at 10 percent to capture the real costs 
of trade, and any further implicit trade barrier is attributed to demand differ- 
ences, as measured by the demand parameters, a,. This approach means that 
trade barriers are viewed as real costs. 
2.4  Import Tariffs 
In this section we study the effects of tariffs imposed by a single country on 
its imports from all sources. We take the United Kingdom as the country im- 
posing the tariff. This is of course a hypothetical experiment, the United King- 
dom having treaty obligations prohibiting it from following such a policy. The 
role of  the experiment is to demonstrate the possible effects of  a unilateral 
tariff and to compare these effects both across equilibrium concepts and across 
industries. We  shall initially  study oligopoly, holding the number of  firms in 
each industry and country constant, and then move on to cases in which entry 
and exit occur. 
In order to focus on cross-equilibrium differences, we first consider a single 
industry and, for these purposes, take NACE 346, electrical domestic appli- 
ances, an industry with moderate returns to scale and a moderate level of con- 
centration. Figure 2.1 gives the U.K. welfare gains (i.e., the sum of the change 
CI 
lb  i 0 
Tariff 
Fig. 2.1  Import tariff and welfare 50  Anthony J. Venables 
in consumer surplus, profits, and government revenue expressed as a percent- 
age of U.K. base consumption of the product) as a function of the tariff rate 
for each of  the four different equilibria. Positive tariffs raise welfare in all 
cases, but the main thing to note from this figure is that case C-Cournot 
equilibrium in segmented markets-gives  welfare gains which are very much 
higher than the other cases. Following case C, the gains are next highest for 
the other segmented-market case, B, followed by  the two integrated-market 
cases, CB and CI. The optimal tariff rate is greatest in case C, although optimal 
tariff rates vary little between the four cases. The absolute size of the welfare 
gain, relative to the size of the industry, is rather small. For example, at a 10 
percent tariff rate, case C yields welfare gains amounting to 1.54 percent of 
U.K. base consumption, and in case CI gains are 1.03 percent. 
The change in the components of welfare are significantly larger than the 
change in overall welfare, and these are illustrated in figures 2.2-2.4.  For ex- 
ample, in case C, consumer surplus at a  10 percent tariff is reduced by  an 
amount equal to some 4 percent of U.K. base consumption, and profits in- 
creased by an amount equal to 3 percent of the value of U.K. base production. 
The most noteworthy feature of  figures 2.2 and 2.3 is that the impact of the 
tariff on consumers and producers is smallest in  case B, segmented-market 
price competition. Equations (7) and (9) illustrate that changes in market share 
have relatively little effect on price-marginal  cost margins in this case; we 
therefore see that the profit gains of domestic firms following the tariff are 
approximately half the size they are under case C. The reduction in consumer 
surplus is correspondingly small, although tariff revenue is relatively large; the 
0 
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lower value of  E  calibrated in case B means that imports decline relatively 
slowly as a function of the tariff. 
The conclusions derived from NACE 346 are supported by  study of the 
other eight industries. For 346 the welfare gain from a relatively high tariff is 
largest in case C, followed by  B, CB, then CI. This ranking is broadly con- Table 2.5  Welfare Effects of Import Tariffs under Oligopoly (welfare gain as a percentage of base 
consumption, by NACE class and equilibrium type) 
Tariff Rate  Tariff Rate  Tariff Rate 
Equilibrium  Equilibrium  Equilibrium 














0.59  0.96  1.15  1.20 
0.46  0.71  0.79  0.73 
0.44  0.67  0.74  0.67 
0.44  0.70  0.80  0.77 
260 
2.23  3.93  5.07  5.64 
1.58  2.27  2.31  1.98 
1.53  2.15  2.15  1.80 
1.15  1.55  1.44  1.07 
322 
0.67  0.44  -0.20  -0.81 
0.65  0.40  -0.25  -0.88 
0.65  0.40  -0.26  -0.89 














1.52  2.09  1.97 
0.88  0.81  0.10 
0.84  0.76  0.02 
0.70  0.62  -0.15 
342 
0.76  1.04  0.96 
0.72  0.96  0.84 
0.71  0.94  0.83 
0.71  0.96  0.85 
1.15  1.54  1.46 
0.92  1.11  0.86 
0.85  1.03  0.77 





































0.12  - 
350 
2.13  2.24  1.99 
1.19  0.78  -0.03 
1.11  0.75  0.03 
1.22  1.09  0.64 
0.64  0.48  0.39 
0.43  0.21  0.07 
0.42  0.19  0.05 
0.37  0.12  -0.03 
0.48  0.47  0.47 
0.03  0.00  0.00 
0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
-0.10  -0.14  -0.15 
438 
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firmed across the other eight industries. Table 2.5 reports the U.K. welfare gain 
(as a percentage of base U.K. consumption) for tariff rates of 5, 10, 15, and 20 
percent, for each industry. For every industry, case C gives significantly larger 
welfare effects than the other cases, and the gains in CB exceed those in CI. 
The results  from  these  industries  (obtained,  of  course, with the functional 
forms of  this model)  therefore  confirm the Markusen  and Venables (1988) 
findings that, with Cournot behavior, tariff policy is more powerful when mar- 
kets are segmented than when they are integrated. However, the relative rank- 
ing of CB and CI against B varies across industries. Segmented-market Ber- 
trand behavior may produce even smaller welfare gains from tariff policy than 
arise under integrated markets. 
Looking across industries we see that the four industries with the largest 
gains from tariffs are 260 (artificial fibers), 330 (office machinery), 346 (do- 
mestic  appliances), and 350 (motor vehicles). These are the four industries 
with the highest levels of concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index 
(see table 2.1), although they are not the industries with the highest returns to 
scale. Even in these industries the gains from the tariff are rather modest reach- 
ing, in case C, gains of around 1.5-2.5  percent of base consumption. The ex- 
ception to this is artificial and synthetic fibers (NACE 260), in which gains 
from the tariff exceed 5 percent of base U.K. consumption. The main reason 
for this industry to be exceptional seems to be its low aggregate demand elas- 
ticity, q,  which is equal to 0.5. This means that the deadweight loss associated 
with the tariff is small. 
So far we have assumed that the number of firms in  the industry is held 
constant. How do things change when entry and exit occur to restore profits to 
their  pretariff  levels? Table 2.6  gives  for this  case information  analogous 
to that in table 2.5. Several noteworthy features are apparent. First, compar- 
ing the effects of policy across equilibria C, CB, CI, B, we see that the gains 
from the tariff are now greatest in case B-reversing  the position when the 
number of firms are constant. The reason for this follows from the observation 
made above about the effect of tariffs on profits. Under price competition (B) 
tariffs raise profits relatively little (see fig. 2.3); correspondingly, there is a 
relatively small increase in the number of firms operating in the United King- 
dom, leaving firms operating at a relatively larger scale. Under price competi- 
tion (B) tariffs therefore give rise to more significant achievement of  econo- 
mies of scale than is the case with Cournot behavior (C). 
Free entry also reverses the ranking of cases CB and CI, with the welfare 
gain in case CI now always exceeding that in case CB. Furthermore, for most 
(although not all) of the experiments reported in table 2.6, case CI yields larger 
gains than case C, i.e., policy is more powerful when markets are integrated 
than when they are segmented. This reverses the relative magnitudes of the 
effects of  tariffs under oligopoly, where we saw that with Cournot behavior 
policy was more powerful when markets were segmented. This also alerts us 
to the possible sensitivity of results with respect to functional form. We know Table 2.6  Welfare Effects of Import Tariffs under Free Entry (welfare gain as a percentage of base 
consumption, by NACE class and equilibrium type) 
Tariff Rate  Tariff Rate  Tariff Rate 
Equilibrium  Equilibrium  Equilibrium 














0.60  0.40  0.99  0.96 
0.57  0.86  0.94  0.89 
0.59  0.90  1.01  0.98 
0.65  1.03  1.22  1.26 
260 
0.93  0.70  0.45  0.33 
1.02  0.84  0.36  -0.08 
1.04  0.89  0.43  -0.01 
1.45  1.79  1.66  1.36 
322 
1.27  1.17  0.77  0.43 
1.28  1.18  0.79  0.45 
1.28  1.19  0.79  0.45 














0.73  0.33  0.21 
1.53  1.33  0.90 
1.62  1.48  1.05 
2.01  2.21  1.85 
1.13  1.53  1.50 
1.14  1.55  1.53 
1.15  1.57  1.57 
1.17  1.64  1.67 
1.15  1.29  1.05 
1.11  1.23  0.95 
1.18  1.40  1.19 








































1.33  0.97 
1.25  0.82 
1.60  1.31 
2.31  2.33 
438 
0.31  0.14 
0.39  0.18 
0.40  0.19 
0.47  0.26 
451 
0.02  0.01 
0.01  -0.01 
0.01  -0.01 
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from the work of Horstman and Markusen (1986) that if  demands are linear 
and product differentiation  is country (rather than firm) specific, then, with 
Cournot behavior and free entry, tariff policy raises welfare when markets are 
segmented, but has no effect on welfare when markets are integrated. 
The absolute magnitude of the welfare effects are, in this case as under oli- 
gopoly, rather small, never exceeding 2.5 percent of base consumption. It is 
worth noting however that, whereas under oligopoly there were large redistri- 
butions from consumers to profits and to government, in this case profits are 
unchanged (by the free-entry assumption), there is in most cases a small in- 
crease in consumer surplus (for reasons  analyzed in Venables [1985]), and 
most of the welfare gains accrue in the form of government revenue. Looking 
across industries, we see that, as was the case under oligopoly, the largest gains 
from policy come in the most highly concentrated industries, namely 260 (ar- 
tifical fibers), 330 (office machinery), 346 (domestic appliances), and 350 (mo- 
tor vehicles). 
2.5  Export Taxes 
The second policy experiment we consider is an export tax or subsidy. It is 
on this topic that the theoretical literature  has most clearly highlighted  the 
possible sensitivity of results to the equilibrium concept. We consider first the 
case of  oligopoly and then turn to the effect of  export subsidies under free 
entry. 
In order to illustrate the difference between equilibrium concepts ,  we con- 
centrate first on a single industry-once  again taking NACE 346 (domestic 
electrical appliances) as our example. Figure 2.5 illustrates the effect of an 
export taxkubsidy on this industry. The figure plots U.K. welfare gain as a 
function of the export tax, and from the figure we see positive gains from an 
export subsidy under all four equilibrium concepts. The optimal subsidy is in 
the range 4-5  percent in all cases, but the optimal policy yields only small 
gains-somewhat  less than 0.1 percent of  consumption in case B and only 
0.25 percent of base consumption in the most powerful case, CB. 
In interpreting these results it is important to note that the gains from the 
export subsidy consist of an increase in profits, a loss of government revenue, 
the sum of  these being a net loss, plus a consumer surplus gain. Export policy 
is transmitted back to domestic consumers through two possible routes. The 
first is that in this industry marginal costs are a decreasing function of output; 
export-subsidy-induced expansion therefore reduces the price charged to do- 
mestic consumers. It is this effect which means that there are welfare gains 
even when markets are segmented and there is price competition (case B). 
However, the gains are smallest in this case, as would be expected from the 
work of Eaton and Grossman (1986). 
The second route by which export policy is transmitted to domestic consum- 
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Fig. 2.5  Export tax and welfare 
integration (i.e., firms do not take decisions on a segmented market basis). This 
means that subsidization in one market will reduce prices in  others; export 
subsidies therefore give domestic consumer surplus gains, and it is this that 
accounts for the fact that welfare gains are relatively large in cases CI and CB. 
This is seen most clearly for NACE 257 (pharmaceutical products). This is the 
only industry in the sample in which, we assume, there are constant marginal 
costs (loglinear cost share = 0; table 2.1). At a 2 percent export subsidy, the 
sum of  profits and government revenue is negative for all four cases. In the 
segmented-market equilibria, cases B and C, domestic consumer surplus is 
unchanged by  export policy. However, in cases CB and CI export subsidies 
raise  domestic consumer  surplus,  giving the net  welfare  gains reported  in 
table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 summarizes the position in all the industries, reporting the U.K. 
welfare gain from export subsidies set at 4 percent and 2 percent, and from a 
2 percent export tax (with changes measured from a base position of zero ex- 
port tax). The most frequent ranking of  welfare gain by  equilibrium type is 
that the gains are largest (or losses smallest) in case C, followed by cases CB, 
CI, and B. In all cases the gains from an export subsidy are small, only reach- 
ing as much as 1 percent of base consumption in one case (260). Although a 2 
percent export tax reduces welfare in all cases, the range of values of the export 
tadsubsidy which produces an improvement over free trade seems extremely 
small-in  six of the nine industries there are losses from export taxes set as 
high as +2 percent or as low as -4  percent, under all types of equilibria. In 
only three industries (260, artificial fibers, 346, domestic electrical appliances, 
and 350, motor vehicles) are there gains, under all types of equilibria, from Table 2.7  Welfare Effects of Export Tariffs under Oligopoly (welfare gain as a percentage of base 
consumption, by  NACE class and equilibrium type) 
Export Tax Rate  Export Tax Rate  Export Tax Rate 
Equilibrium  Equilibrium  Equilibrium 














-0.23  -0.06  -0.03 
-0.01  0.04  -0.13 
-0.02  0.04  -0.11 
-0.24  -0.08  0.00 
260 
1.01  0.55  -0.48 
0.46  0.26  -0.29 
0.42  0.25  -0.27 
0.06  0.07  -0.12 
322 
-1.34  -0.25  -0.24 
-1.31  -0.25  -0.23 
-1.31  -0.25  -0.23 














-1.09  0.23  -0.96 
-0.49  0.03  -0.36 
-0.46  0.02  -0.33 
-0.63  -0.10  -0.17 
342 
-0.38  -0.05  -0.17 
-0.34  -0.03  -0.18 
-0.34  -0.03  -0.17 
-0.36  -0.05  -0.15 
346 
0.22  0.14  -0.18 
0.25  0.15  -0.18 
0.21  0.13  -0.16 














0.92  0.66  -0.77 
0.87  0.54  -0.63 
0.63  0.40  -0.50 
0.15  0.16  -0.27 
438 
-0.65  0.04  -0.21 
-0.40  0.03  -0.18 
-0.39  0.03  -0.18 
-0.41  0.00  -0.16 
451 
-3.49  -0.19  -0.14 
-2.39  -0.16  -0.13 
-2.38  -0.16  -0.13 
-2.44  -0.17  -0.21 58  Anthony J. Venables 
export subsidies set at both 2 percent and 4 percent. These industries share the 
common characteristics of high concentration and a relatively low volume of 
exports (see table 2.1). The low volume of exports means that the revenue cost 
of export subsidies is relatively  small. The effect of export subsidies at the 
margin is therefore obtained without the revenue cost of large subsidies being 
paid on existing, intramarginal export quantities. 
The effects of export subsidies under free entry are summarized in table 2.8. 
The same three industries (250, 346, and 350) have unambiguous gains from 
2 percent and 4 percent export subsidies, as was the case under oligopoly. The 
magnitude of the gains remains extremely modest, generally not exceeding 1 
percent of base consumption. Notice that in some, although not all industries, 
the ordering of equilibria by welfare gain is changed; for example, in industry 
350, free entry reverses the ordering of  equilibria as compared to oligopoly 
giving the largest welfare gain in case B, followed by CI, CB, and C. The 
reason for this is as it was for tariffs; the policy has a relatively smaller profit 
effect in equilibrium B than in C, so fewer firms enter the industry, giving an 
equilibrium with fewer firms and lower average costs. The most striking fea- 
ture of table 2.8 is the extremely large welfare losses imposed by export sub- 
sidies in some cases-322  (machine tools), 330 (office machinery), and 45 1 
(footwear). In these industries the U.K. export subsidy is sufficient to drive the 
number of  firms in  some other countries to zero. There are then very  large 
increases in U.K. exports, and the revenue cost of the subsidy becomes ex- 
tremely large, this accounting for the size of the welfare loss. 
2.6  Constant Parameters 
Each experiment so far has been based on the following method. Assume a 
type of  equilibrium, calibrate this equilibrium of the model to the data, and 
then simulate policy changes. As we saw in section 2.3, this implies different 
values for some parameters of the model (E and a,)  in each of the cases C, B, 
CB, and CI. Comparison of the effects of policy changes for different cases 
therefore incorporates different equilibrium types and different parameter val- 
ues-these  being chosen to support the same base equilibrium. An alternative 
procedure (and the standard one in theoretical work) would be to compare the 
effects of policy for different equilibrium types given the same parameter val- 
ues in all cases-although  this implies different values of endogenous vari- 
ables in the initial equilibrium.  What difference does it make if we follow 
this route? 
We can address this question in the following way. First, calibrate an indus- 
try to a particular  equilibrium type. Second, given the calibrated parameters 
compute the equilibrium of the model under an alternative equilibrium con- 
cept, so generating a new “base” equilibrium. Third, introduce policy changes, 
and simulate the way in which the equilibrium moves from this new base. 
Table 2.9 reports the results  of following this procedure  for one industry Table 2.8  Welfare Effects of Export Taxes under Free Entry (welfare gain as a percentage of base 
consumption, by NACE class and equilibrium type) 
Export Tax Rate 
Equilibrium  Equilibrium 














-0.23  -0.03  -0.10 
0.20  0.18  -0.26 
0.29  0.22  -0.33 
0.28  0.21  -0.31 
260 
0.52  0.51  -0.50 
0.33  0.28  -0.32 
0.32  0.27  -0.31 
0.34  0.22  -0.27 
322 
-  12.56 -0.20  -  1.76 
-12.77  -0.19  -1.82 
-12.77  -0.18  -1.82 













Export Tax Rate 
Equilibrium 
-4%  -2%  2%  Type 
330 
-19.10  -4.42  -1.72  C 
-7.33  -0.50  -2.11  CB 
-12.30  -0.19  -2.17  CI 
-7.26  0.93  -2.23  B 
342 
-0.01  0.45  -0.82  C 
0.17  0.54  -0.92  CB 
0.25  0.58  -0.94  CI 
0.39  0.62  -0.97  B 
346 
0.30  0.20  -0.23  C 
0.42  0.24  -0.29  CB 
0.46  0.25  -0.27  CI 
0.45  0.25  -0.26  B 
Export Tax Rate 
-4%  -2%  2% 
350 
0.44  0.80  -1.04 
0.88  0.84  -1.02 
1.07  0.82  -0.96 
1.13  0.73  -0.86 
438 
-1.03  0.01  -0.22 
-0.64  0.07  -0.23 
-0.61  0.07  -0.24 
-0.49  0.09  -0.24 
451 
-10.32  -0.43  -0.16 
-9.01  -0.32  -0.18 
-8.98  -0.31  -0.18 
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Table 2.9  Trade Policy Comparisons with Parameters Constant across 
Equilibria (welfare gain as a percentage of base consumption for 
NACE 346) 
Calibration on 
Calibration on  Respective  Welfare Change 
Equilibrium Type C  Equilibrium Type*  due to Change in 
Equilibrium  Equilibrium Type 
Type  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (3 
Tariff Rate 
5%  15%  5%  15% 
C  1.15  1.46  1.15  I .46 
CB  0.77  0.64  0.92  0.86 
CI  0.69  0.50  0.85  0.77 





Export Tax  Rate 
4%  -  2%  -4%  -  2% 
C  0 22  0 14  0 22  0 14 
CB  0 24  0 15  0 25  0 15 
CI  0 20  0 13  0 21  0 13 
B  0 08  0 07  0 10  0 08 
"From tables 2.5 and 2.7. 
(once again NACE 346, electrical domestic appliances) taking case C as the 
equilibrium type against which the model  is calibrated. Column (5) of this 
table gives the welfare change associated with moving from the equilibrium of 
type C to an alternative type of  equilibrium (with no policy change and un- 
changed parameters). There are welfare gains because,  as noted previously, 
case C is the least competitive of the equilibrium types under study. From this 
new base equilibrium policy changes are introduced and reported in columns 
(1) and (2) of the table. Columns (3)  and (4) reproduce results from sections 
2.3 and 2.4 for purposes of comparison. Results are reported only for two val- 
ues of  each experiment, and only for cases in which the number of  firms is 
held constant. 
From table 2.9 we see that the gains from policy, both  import tariffs and 
export subsidies, are somewhat reduced when simulations are undertaken us- 
ing parameters obtained from calibration under equilibrium type C (columns 
[  11 and [2], compared to 131 and 141). The reason for this is that the calibrated 
elasticity  E  is highest for case C (see table 2.2). Using this higher elasticity 
reduces firms'  price-cost margins in the new base equilibrium. The distortion 
due to imperfect competition is thereby reduced, and consequently policy has 
a smaller welfare effect. However, the basic conclusions of previous sections 61  Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Numerical Assessment 
still hold. For example, the export subsidy raises welfare in all cases, and by 
considerably more in case C than in case B. 
2.7  Conclusions 
The simulations reported in this paper study the welfare implications of two 
trade policy  instruments, an import tariff  and an export tax. The effects of 
these instruments are examined in a family of models of trade under imperfect 
competition, applied to nine industries in the European Community. From the 
large number of simulations undertaken, what conclusions can be drawn? 
The first message to emerge from the simulations is the small size of  the 
welfare gains that can be derived from use of these policy instruments. Under 
oligopoly there is only one industry  in which tariffs  yield welfare  gains in 
excess of 2.5 percent of the base value of consumption of the industry’s output. 
Taking simple averages across industries and equilibrium types we see that the 
gains from tariffs of 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent average out at 0.48, 0.81, 0.99, 
and 0.82 percent of base consumption, respectively. With free entry the average 
gains are somewhat larger, at 0.66, 0.88, 1.05, and 1.00 percent of base con- 
sumption for these  tariff  rates. Export  subsidies  give even  smaller welfare 
gains, only reaching 1 percent of base consumption in a few of the cases stud- 
ied. Under oligopoly the net welfare figure is the difference between increases 
in firms’ profits and losses for either consumers or government. This means 
that if  these components  of  welfare were weighted  differently, then  results 
could easily be changed. For example, attaching a premium to government 
revenue would strengthen the case for import tariffs  and rapidly  destroy the 
case for export subsidies. 
The second message from the simulations is that, looking across industries, 
the gains from policy intervention are greater the more concentrated the indus- 
try.  This is as would be expected.  Tariff policy  offers welfare gains for all 
industries studied, these gains arising both from the distortions associated with 
imperfect competition and from standard terms of trade effects. The effect of 
export subsidies is more varied across industries, with only three of the nine 
industries studied giving unambiguous welfare gains from a 4 percent export 
subsidy, these three being industries with a relatively high level of concentra- 
tion. The reason for the greater ambiguity in the effects of export subsidies is, 
of course, that the effect of the policy on distortions and its effect on the terms 
of trade work in opposite directions. Another industrial characteristic that is 
important in determining the effects of an export subsidy is the base volume 
of exports. An industry with a large volume of exports will incur a heavy reve- 
nue  cost of  subsidizing  existing  exports,  in  order  to achieve  the  marginal 
expansion in exports, and is therefore less likely to generate welfare gains from 
the export subsidy. 
Third, although the welfare gains from these policies are relatively small, 62  Anthony J. Venables 
the quantity effects are quite large. Some part of  a tariff is absorbed by  the 
supplying firm, but the larger part is passed on to consumers, and with elasticit- 
ies of  demand for individual models at the levels reported in table 2.1, the 
order of magnitude of the quantity effect is apparent. Quantity effects are par- 
ticularly  large  in the case  of  trade-promoting  policies-export  subsidies- 
since they permit exporters to undercut firms in their home markets and lead, 
in some cases, to some degree of international specialization of  production. 
This suggests that in order to adequately capture the effects of  trade policy, 
models of  imperfect competition  need to be put into a general  equilibrium 
framework.  Factor  price  changes  would  then  reduce  the  size  of  quantity 
changes and reduce the likelihood of specialization. 
Fourth, the simulations of this paper explored a number of different equilib- 
rium concepts: from the case of price competition (B) to the less competitive 
behavior implied by Cournot equilibrium (C), from pure market segmentation 
to pure integration (CI), as well as the intermediate case of integrated-market 
Cournot competition followed by segmented-market price games (CB). These 
cases cover a wide range of possible behavior, although it cannot be claimed 
that actual industry behavior is necessarily within the range spanned by these 
cases-for  example, the industry  may be more collusive than is implied by 
Cournot behavior. The four different equilibria  studied lead to significantly 
different interpretations of the base data sets, as calibration generated different 
elasticities of demand, in each case, and different levels of the implicit barriers 
to trade. 
How  do results  differ across these four types  of  equilibria? Ranking the 
effectiveness of policy  across cases yield  some quite  surprising results.  As 
would be expected, under oligopoly, policy is more effective if  the industry 
has Coumot competition  than if  it has Bertrand competition. But with free 
entry this is (in most cases) reversed; in the long run there are greater gains 
from policy under the more competitive Bertrand interpretation of the industry, 
similarly, with the segmentedintegrated dimension. Under oligopoly, policy is 
more effective  when  markets are segmented than  when  they are integrated; 
with free entry this distinction  is less clear, and in most cases the gains from 
policy are greater when markets are integrated. Despite these changes in rank- 
ing, the overall sensitivity of results with respect to equilibrium type is not as 
great as might have been feared from a reading of the theoretical literature. 
For example, there are relatively few cases in which moving from one type of 
equilibrium to another changes the sign of the welfare effect of the policy. The 
tariff simulations report four different tariff rates on nine industries for both 
oligopoly and free entry. This generates 72 cases for each of  which results 
were derived under the four different equilibria; in 10 of the 72 cases there are 
sign differences between the equilibria. Export taxes were evaluated at three 
different rates,  and in only 7 of the 54 cases are there  sign changes as the 
experiments go across equilibria. 63  Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Numerical Assessment 
This paper has not, of course, investigated all possible dimensions of sensi- 
tivity analysis. For example, results may well be sensitive to choice of func- 
tional form. But the conclusion which emerges from the simulations is that 
trade models of this type provide a rather weak case for policy intervention. 
This is not because results are so sensitive to market structure that anything is 
possible, but rather because even if government gets the policy right, the maxi- 
mum gains it can expect from it are quite small. 
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Comment  David G. Tam 
The paper by Venables is interesting in a number of respects and represents 
another application of the model and extensive data set developed by Smith 
and Venables (1988) regarding the EC  1992 project. If  properly interpreted, 
this work is a helpful first step in the process of assessing the consequences of 
1992. My concern, however, is that the model and calibration  do not  allow 
Venables (or Smith and Venables in the related papers) to make the interpreta- 
tions he does in three important areas: (1) the model is not a full Dixit-Stiglitz 
model, but rather closer to Armington, (2) the rates of trade protection reported 
are not trade protection, but rather a combination of trade protection and taste 
preferences,  and (3) as a consequence of (2), the exercises which assess the 
liberalization of trade protection, especially market integration liberalizations 
such as 1992, are eliminating the taste preferences consumers have for national 
products along with the trade protection, attributing therefore too much to the 
trade liberalization. These will be discussed in turn. 
The Model Is Closer to an Armington than to a Dixit-Stiglitz Model 
Equation (1) of the paper simply does not follow from the assumptions of 
the author. It is claimed that  products are differentiated  by  firm and model 
variety of the firm, and the Dixit-Stiglitz model is employed. We need to define 
some notation to investigate this. For a typical industry like automobiles, let 
x,,,  = the output of variety ci produccd in country i and sold in country  j, 
pa,, = the price of  variety ci produced in country i and sold in country j,  and 
aery  = a parameter in the utility function of consumers in country j reflecting 
taste preferences for variety  ci produced in country i. 
Then, if  we follow Dixit-Stiglitz, the preferences  of consumers in country j 
can be characterized as CES and we have that their utility is 
where E = 1/(  1 -  p), and otherwise notation is in Venables. 
preferences, to equation (1) of Venables? Make the following assumptions: 
(A) 
(B) 
I now ask how we can get from our equation (I), which is Dixit-Stiglitz 
qXc,  = a,, for all ci, i,  and j,  and 
p,,, =  p,  for all a,  i, and j 
David Tarr is a senior trade economist at the World Bank. 
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If the consumer in country j maximizes our utility function (1) subject to ex- 
penditure  allocated to the good in question being fixed, it follows from as- 
sumptions A and B that 
(C)  xau =  xo  for all a,  i, and j. 
That is, consumers in country j will buy an equal amount of each variety of 
the goods from country i. If we substitute (A) and (C) into (1) we arrive at 
equation (1) of Venables (and of Smith-Venables 1988). 
To arrive at Venables’s equation (I), however, we have developed a frame- 
work in which the price of Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen are the same (B), 
and in which when consumers face equal prices for these cars they buy them 
in equal proportions  (C). This is a long way  from product variety within  a 
country. The only significant product differentiation in Venables’s equation (1) 
is by country of origin. In fact, except for the scalar factor, n,m,, which reflects 
love of variety, Venables’s equation (1) is exactly the Armington specification, 
where products are differentiated by  country of  origin only. Thus, I  suggest 
that this model is closer to an Armington model (without nesting) than to the 
Dixit-Stiglitz product variety model.’ 
Taste Differences Are Calibrated as Trade Protection 
From equation (4) of Venables, we have that the ratio of sales of  country  i 
in country j to the sales of country j in country j can be written as 
Let pu  be the border price of products from country  i sold in country j and t, 
be the rate of protection applied on products from country i in country j;  let te 
be the combination  of  tariffs  and nontariff-barrier equivalents. Rewrite (2), 
recognizing that it is the tariff-inclusive  price that consumers pay  for their 
products that enters the utility maximization problem (and tJJ  = 0): 
(3) 
The usual calibration procedure involves a search for estimates of the rate of 
protection tv, which is difficult, and given these exogenous estimates of to,  the 
taste parameters a.  are calibrated to assure initial equilibrium. In this paper, 
however, the to  are taken to equal 10 percent of all countries, which is assumed 
to equal transportation costs. Any further difference in the ratio of the sales of 
country i in country j to sales of the home country firms is attributed to trade 
distortions.  That is, consumers  in country j  are assumed to display no taste 
differences  among the products  of  any  countries in the model;  any  market 
I. Instead of using (A) and (B) to derive (C) given equation (l), it is possible to assume (A) 
and (C) from which (B) follows. These are equivalent procedures from the perspective of  the 
interpretation of what type of model we have. 66  Anthony J. Venables 
share  differences  beyond  transportation  costs  are  due  to  trade  distortions. 
“Trade distortions” are, thus, endogenously calibrated from (3). 
If Germans prefer strong beer and Americans prefer weak beer, there will 
be differences in the market shares of each country’s producers in the two mar- 
kets, independent of trade  distortions. Thus, tables  2.3 and 2.4 of estimated 
trade distortions cannot be interpreted as such. The values are in fact a combi- 
nation  of  taste  differences and trade protection;  without  the  usual  external 
search for rates of trade protection, we have no way of knowing whether taste 
differences constitute almost all or almost none of the calculated values. 
Eliminating Taste Preferences Is Interpreted as Trade Liberalization in 
These Models 
Given the method by which trade protection is calibrated, when a trade liber- 
alization exercise is conducted in this model, such as the market integration of 
1992, the first thing that is done is to assume that the taste parameters (a,,) are 
reduced or equalized in the markets that are liberalizing. This is interpreted as 
a reduction in protection. For small changes in protection, where significant 
differences in the a,,  remain, this is an acceptable exercise because  we can 
assume that we have not exceeded any real rates of protection in the economy. 
For  more  significant  simulated  changes  in  protection,  such  as  the  1992 
changes, however, this procedure will eliminate taste changes as well. Thus, 
what Smith-Venables refer to as the “more conservative” estimates are proba- 
bly closer to the truth. 
Conclusion 
I note also that the partial-equilibrium  approach represented in this work 
leads  to  some  obvious  biases.  For  example,  all  10 sectors  in  the  Smith- 
Venables work on EC 92 expand. Since capital and labor must  come from 
somewhere, obviously not all sectors can expand. One cannot simply apply a 
methodology like this across many industries and obtain an aggregate result. 
Thus, there is a need to do the kind of  research suggested by these models in 
general equilibrium. Multilevel CES nesting is required, however, to incorpo- 
rate the fact that the goods of individual countries in the European Community 
will become better substitutes after 1992, that is the issue is not simply one of 
lowering border protection. If product variety is to be incorporated, it could be 
done at the bottom level of the CES nest, along the lines of Krishna, Hogan, 
and Swage1  in this volume. A properly interpreted version of the work of Smith 
and Venables will provide good intuition into these effects until results from 
more complicated general equilibrium studies are available. 